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The Flight Training Department at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Daytona
Beach, has been contemplating implementing an Aviation Safety Action Program
(ASAP) in order to help protect students and instructors from certificate action. This
feasibility study analyzed what motivated instructor pilots to submit safety reports, and if
an ASAP would increase reporting from instructor pilots. It also identified what concerns
existed among instructors and managers regarding an ASAP. A survey was given to
instructors and managers; also instructors in leadership roles were interviewed. It was
found that the benefit to the organization and peers was the highest motivation factor to
submit safety reports and no significant evidence existed for an increase in reporting
under an ASAP. In fact, instructors and managers were concerned with Federal Aviation
Administration involvement and with the potential for an ASAP to decrease reporting.
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Chapter I
Introduction
Safety of an organization is usually an economic problem (Wood, 2003). In the
1800‟s, the industrial revolution was in progress and there was no organized effort to
reduce accidents or injuries. If the accident were the fault of the company, the worker or
their families would have to hire a lawyer to take the company to court, which almost
never worked. The company could simply outlast them. However, that all changed when
the idea of workers compensation migrated to the United States and by 1930 all states
had workers compensation laws on the books. The employer through a mandatory
insurance scheme paid the costs of the program where the premiums were based on the
company‟s accident record. Suddenly, it became clear to the employer that it was
cheaper to not have the accident in the first place than it was to pay for the results of it
(Wood, 2003).
Accidents and incidents cause direct and indirect costs associated with them
(Wood, 2003). In addition, it is argued that safety is an ethical obligation of
organizations and sometimes is required to maintain certain safety standards by
regulation. Organizations that choose to take a proactive stance on safety will usually
develop a safety program within their organization with the mission of reducing accidents
(Wood, 2003).
The Federal Aviation Administration‟s (FAA) mission is to provide the safest,
most efficient aerospace system in the world (FAA, 2011b). The FAA has begun the
rule-making process to require airports and Part 121 air carriers to develop and
implement a Safety Management System (SMS). The essential idea for any SMS is to
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provide for a systematic approach to achieving acceptable levels of safety risk (FAA,
2011b). An SMS is comprised of four functional components (Safety Policy, Safety
Assurance, Safety Risk Management, and Safety Promotion), including an intangible, but
always critical, aspect called safety culture (FAA, 2011b).
Significance of the Study
One of the cornerstones of an SMS is a safety-reporting program (FAA, 2011b).
A safety-reporting program enables members of an organization to report hazards that
can lead to an aircraft accident or incident. The success of a safety program goes beyond
the physical capabilities of the program but also relies on the existence of a strong
reporting culture within the organization.
Currently Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University (ERAU) has an internal event
reporting system used by its instructors, students, and other employees called an Event
Reporting System or Aviation Safety Reports (AvSRs). The FAA has a formal voluntary
safety-reporting program for certificated operators known as the Aviation Safety Action
Program (ASAP) (FAA, 2002).

ASAP encourages a certificated operator‟s employees

to report safety information that may be critical in preventing accidents. ASAP
formalizes the collection, analysis, and retention of safety data. It also resolves safety
issues, reported through an ASAP, through corrective action rather than through
punishment or discipline. In fact, the ASAP encourages the reporting of safety issues or
events that involve non-compliance with Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14
CFR) through enforcement related incentives that are designed into the program (FAA,
2002).
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Statement of the Problem
ERAU employs an internal aviation safety reporting program that does not
involve the FAA. The program is supported by a strong organizational safety culture that
stimulates the reporting of safety issues. The College of Aviation has a safety department
that manages the internal safety reporting program. The safety department has its own
formal processes for the collection, analysis and retention of safety data. The safety
department also recommends corrective action to the College of Aviation‟s and the Flight
Department‟s leadership. Though ERAU has its own successful internal safety reporting
program, there may be additional benefits derived from implementing a formal ASAP.
However, the change in internal processes or involvement of the FAA in ERAU‟s
internal reporting program could negatively affect their entire safety program.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this study was to determine the feasibility of ERAU implementing
a formal ASAP program, as defined in FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 120-66B (FAA,
2002) and identifying the impact on safety of ERAU‟s flight program.
Research Questions
What currently motivates ERAU instructor pilots to report safety events?
Would ERAU‟s implementation of an ASAP increase safety reporting among instructor
pilots?
What concerns exist among instructor pilots and flight department management in
implementing an ASAP program?
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Delimitations
This study was limited to exploring the impact on the safety culture of ERAU‟s
Daytona Beach flight department, if they were to implement a formal ASAP program.
The study was limited to the perceptions of instructor pilots and management personnel
within the flight department at ERAU, Daytona Beach.
Limitations and Assumptions
This study was limited to the current perceptions relating to the possibility of
implementing an ASAP, rather than a comparative study between the perceptions preimplementation and post-implementation of an ASAP. It was assumed that all responses
given in the surveys and structured interviews were truthful and correct by all
participants.
Definition of Terms
ASAP

A formal FAA voluntary safety-reporting program for certificated
operators that offers certain enforcement-related incentives for
FAA certificated personnel of the operator (FAA, 2002).

AvSR

An ERAU internal Aviation Safety Report that can be submitted
voluntarily by ERAU employees and students (ERAU, 2011a).

ERC

A committee that reviews the reports submitted under ASAP and
determines corrective action. The ERC is a representative from the
company, the pilot group or union, and the FAA. All decisions
made by the ERC must be unanimous consensus (FAA, 2002).
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IPQC

A council of instructor pilots elected by their peers in order to
represent instructor pilots on various workgroups with ERAU
Flight Department leadership (ERAU, 2011a).

SMS

A systematic approach to achieving acceptable levels of safety
risk. An SMS is comprised of four functional components: Safety
Policy, Safety Assurance, Safety Risk Management, and Safety
Promotion (FAA, 2011b).

List of Acronyms
AC

Advisory Circular

ASAP

Aviation Safety Action Program

ASRS

Aviation Safety Reporting System

AvSR

Embry-Riddle Aviation Safety Report

CFR

Code of Federal Regulations

ERAU

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University

ERC

Event Review Committee

FAA

Federal Aviation Administration

FOM

Flight Operations Manual

IP

Instructor Pilot

IPQC

Instructor Pilot Quality Council

MOU

Memorandum of Understanding

NASA

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

SMS

Safety Management System
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Chapter II
Review of the Relevant Literature
Aviation Safety Program
Wood (2003) explains the importance of an organization having a safety program:
It is easy to spot an organization that does not have a safety program. There is no
internal reporting system; no deliberate selection of standards; no investigation or
resolution of incidents or hazards; and (worst of all) no knowledge on the part of
top management as to whether things are safe or unsafe. (p. 12)
Many organizations rely on the fact that they have not had an accident recently; they do
not need to take a proactive stance in investing in an Aviation Safety Program. However,
not having an accident recently is not a good measure of an organization‟s safety culture
(Wood, 2003).
Safety culture. Ron Westrum (as cited in Reason, 2008), an American social
scientist, classified safety culture into three kinds: generative, bureaucratic (or
calculative) and pathological. A major distinguishing feature is the way in which an
organization deals with safety-related information – or, more specifically, it is about how
they treat the bearers of bad news:
Generative or high-reliability organizations encourage the upward flow of
safety-related information. They reward the messengers, even when they are
reporting their own potentially dangerous errors. They share a collective
mindfulness of the hazards, respect expertise and are reluctant to simplify
interpretations. They expect bad things to happen and work hard to prepare
for the unexpected.
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Bureaucratic or calculative organizations – the large majority – occupy the
middle ground. They don‟t necessarily shoot the messenger, but they don‟t
welcome him or her either. Bad news and novel ideas create problems. They
tend to be „by-the-book‟ organizations that rely heavily on administrative
controls to limit performance variation on the part of the workforce. Safety
management measures tend to be isolated rather than generalised. They
prefer local engineering fixes rather than widespread systemic reforms.
Pathological organisations are inclined to shoot the messenger. They really
don‟t want to know. Whistle-blowers are muzzled, maligned and
marginalized. The organization shirks its safety responsibilities, doing only
the bare minimum necessary to avoid prosecution and keep one step ahead of
the regulator. It punishes or covers up failures and discourages new ideas.
Production and the bottom line are the main driving forces (Reason, 2008,
p.86).
Reason (as cited in Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2011) defined several components of
a safety culture. They describe the traits an organization should demonstrate in order to
foster a positive safety culture:
Informed culture – Safety management is largely a practice driven by
decision-making. Consistent decision-making is supported by acquisition
and use of sound information. Thus, an organization that constantly
informs itself is more likely to succeed both in business and safety
performance.
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Reporting culture – A key source of safety information comes from
reports from all levels of the organization. An organization must then
make sense of the acquired data by turning the reports into useful
information through analysis.
Just culture – „an atmosphere of trust in which people are encouraged,
even rewarded, for providing essential safety related information but‟.
However, it must also be a culture „in which they are also clear about
where the line must be drawn between acceptable and unacceptable
behavior‟.
Flexible culture – when an organization „possesses the ability to
reconfigure themselves in the face of high tempo operations or certain
kinds of danger‟.
Learning culture – Reporting and other data collection are of little value
unless accompanied by sound analysis. This doesn‟t always have to take
the form of sophisticated analytical or statistical methods. Simple review
and discussion of reports, audit findings and other data is often all that is
required. (pp. 146-147)
Reporting and just culture. Stolzer et al. (2011) highlighted how a just culture can
affect a reporting culture:
There are two proven ways to kill a safety reporting system – burn the reporter or
burn the data. If safety reports are used as a source of information for disciplinary
action, the reporting system will likely suffer an almost immediate demise.
Employees will quickly lose trust in the organization‟s motives. The second way is
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slower but just as deadly to the system. If employees are not convinced that the
organization is serious about acting on the situations that they report, they will
ultimately lose faith in the system and discontinue using it. (p. 146)
On January 25, 2000, Dr. Lucian Leape, a Harvard professor of health, testified
before Congress on what he saw as the state of healthcare safety in the U.S. (Marx,
2009). He told Congress that the single greatest impediment to error prevention in the
medical industry is that “we punish people for making mistakes” (p. 3). A co-author of
the Institute of Medicine‟s (IOM) report, To Err is Human, Leape cited that study‟s
estimated 44,000 to 98,000 annual deaths that were caused as result of medical error
alone. He said that healthcare providers would often only report what they could not
hide. (Marx, 2009)
Sometimes „just‟ or „non-punitive reporting‟ is confused with being free from any
form of discipline (Stolzer et al., 2011). However, it is important that an organization has
clearly stated standards that are consistently and fairly enforced. An organization‟s
members must know what is expected of them in terms of behaviors and performance,
but they also need to be assured that they will not be sanctioned for reporting safety
problems even when they result from inadvertent errors. (Stolzer et al., 2011)
Voluntary reporting systems. One of the most important aspects of incident
investigation has been data collection (Lee & Weitzel, 2005). Although incidents occur
more often than accidents, an incident can only be investigated if it has been reported.
Thus, developing an effective incident reporting system is fundamental to incident
investigation. (Lee & Weitzel, 2005)
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Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). The ASRS is a voluntary program
allowing pilots to submit aviation safety incident reports that can be analyzed in order to
reduce the likelihood of an aviation accident. To improve the effectiveness of the system
by increasing the flow of information from its users, the agency eventually transferred the
operational authority to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The
new administration is non-regulatory and guarantees confidentiality to all users of the
reporting system. FAA (2011c) prohibits the use of any information submitted through
the ASRS toward any disciplinary action, except information regarding criminal offenses
or accidents. When a violation of CFRs comes to the attention of the FAA from a source
other than a report filed with NASA under the ASRS, then the FAA will take appropriate
enforcement action; enforcement-related incentives are available, if the person submitted
a report under ASRS. Neither a civil penalty nor certificate suspension will be imposed
against a person found in violation of the CFRs, if he or she filed a report under ASRS.
This conditional immunity is granted as long as: (a) the violation was inadvertent and not
deliberate; (b) the violation did not involve a criminal offense, accident, or lack of
qualification or competency; (c) the person has not been found in any prior FAA
enforcement action to have committed a violation in the prior 5 years; and (d) the person
submitted a report under ASRS within 10 days after the violation. NASA de-identifies all
incoming reports and uses the information for further analysis to identify trends and
improve aviation safety. The ASRS analysts provide periodic results and make all reports
available to the public (FAA, 2011a).
ASAP. According to FAA (2002), the purpose of the ASAP is to encourage air
carrier and repair station employees to voluntarily report safety information that may be
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critical to identifying potential precursors to accidents. The FAA has determined that
identifying these precursors is essential to further reducing the already low accident rate.
Under an ASAP, safety issues are resolved through corrective action rather than through
punishment or discipline. The ASAP provides for the collection, analysis, and retention
of the safety data that is obtained. ASAP safety data, much of which would otherwise be
unobtainable, is used to develop corrective actions for identified safety concerns, and to
educate the appropriate parties to prevent a reoccurrence of the same type of safety event.
An ASAP is based on a safety partnership that will include the FAA and the certificate
holder, and may include a third party, such as the employee‟s labor organization. To
encourage an employee to voluntarily report safety issues, even though they may involve
the employee‟s possible noncompliance with 14 CFR, enforcement-related incentives
have been designed into the program. (FAA, 2002)
FAA (2002) was first published on January 8, 1997. Since then it has been
revised twice and the program has evolved since its original inception. Currently 170
ASAP Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) are in place between companies, labor
associations and the FAA. Many lessons have been learned as the program has continued
to grow (FAA, 2009).
Event Review Committee (ERC). The heart of an ASAP is the ERC. The ERC
reviews the reports submitted under an ASAP and determines corrective action. The
ERC is a representative from the company, the pilot group or union, and the FAA. All
decisions made by the ERC must be unanimous consensus. Under an ASAP, consensus of
the ERC means the voluntary agreement of all representatives of the ERC to each decision
required by the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). As described in the advisory

circular, consensus does not require that all members believe that the decision or
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recommendation is the best one, but only that it falls into their range of acceptable
outcomes for the particular issue (FAA, 2002). The Sandia report in 2000 on the ASAP
at American Airlines analyzed the fast pragmatic safety decisions made by the Event
Review Team. The report concluded that:
The core of ASAP is the [ERC] whose members are in conflict but work together
as a productive team to analyze events. The team must discern meaning in
complex events, overcoming both uncertainty (lack of information) and
equivocality (lack of clarity). At each event, the team faces a recurring test,
unanimous consensus, that maintains the stability of the overall process. We
model the [ERC] interaction using a tile-table metaphor. The members must
achieve a reasonable balance of views in order to take action. We suggest that
this balance is achieved when members adopt a shared set of cultural priorities
where productive action is paramount. Sideband communications, particularly
humor, allow the [ERC] to construct a working buffer around its members and to
interact effectively and efficiently. (Ganter, 2000, p. 17)
Figure 1 shows the composition of the ERC and outside parties that interface with the
ERC.
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Figure 1. The ERC. Note. Adapted from “Fast Pragmatic Safety Decisions: Analysis of
an Event Review Team of the Aviation Safety Action Partnership (SAND2000-1134)“ by
J. H. Ganter, C. D. Dean, and B. K. Cloer, 2000.

According to a Best Practices for Event Review Committees publication (FAA,
2009) an ERC‟s success largely depends on the characteristics of the individuals who
serve as members. In order for the ERC concept to work effectively, the ERC
representative must be empowered to make decisions within the context of the ERC
discussions on a given report. Senior management and supervisors should not preempt
their respective ERC representative‟s decision-making discretion for an event reported
under the ASAP. If the parties to an ASAP MOU do not permit their respective ERC
representative to exercise this discretion, the capacity of the ERC to achieve consensus
will be undermined, and the program will ultimately fail. (FAA, 2002)
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ERAU aviation safety program
Safety is the primary concern at ERAU (2011a). The University takes a proactive
stance by emphasizing accident prevention, hazard identification, safety data collection
and dissemination, comprehensive emergency response procedures, and an active safety
education program. The effectiveness of the safety program relies on the unrestricted
flow of information between instructors, students, staff and maintenance personnel.
Participation in this program is critical to the continued safety of the University flight
environment. Information voluntarily supplied (which does not involve negligence,
deliberate violations or criminal acts) will not be used for punitive action or implication
of guilt by anyone participating in this program (ERAU, 2011a).
Oversight of the safety of the flight department is vested in the Dean of the
College of Aviation. The Director of Aviation Safety administers the College of
Aviation‟s Aviation Safety Program. The Director of Aviation Safety reports directly to
the Dean of the College of Aviation (see Figure 2).
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Figure 2. Organization structure, ERAU Daytona Beach Flight Training Department.
Note. Adapted from “ERAU Aviation Safety Program” by R. B. Kelly, 2011.

According to ERAU (2011a) the Director of Aviation Safety has the following
authority:
1. Define ERAU investigation and reporting procedures for hazards, incidents, and
accidents.
2. Develop the necessary forms and instructions for implementing the University
Aviation Safety Program.
3. Define and require the reporting of any safety-related event.
4. Conduct an investigation of any safety-related event.
5. Require the grounding, if deemed necessary, of any flight student or instructor
pilot involved in a safety-related event that is under investigation. Only the
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Director of Aviation Safety, may lift safety-related groundings. In the absence of
the Director of Aviation Safety or Chief Flight Instructor, their designated
alternates will fulfill this role.
6. Conduct aviation safety inspections of any ERAU flight-related operation,
facility, or contractor providing flight-related services.
7. Represent ERAU regarding aviation safety matters in dealing with government
agencies and professional organizations.
8. Assume Embry-Riddle Investigator-In-Charge responsibilities for any accident or
incident that is reportable under 49 CFR Part 830 (FAA, 2011c), as amended.
Represent ERAU under the party participant provisions of 49 CFR Part 831
(FAA, 2011c), as amended.
According to ERAU (2011a) the Director of Aviation Safety has the following
responsibilities:
1. Provide safety oversight of all aircraft maintenance and flight-related activities on
a daily basis.
2. Provide aviation safety training as required by the University Aviation Safety
Program.
3. Maintain a reporting system for hazards, incidents, and accidents.
4. Maintain an aviation safety analysis program.
5. Provide feedback on all identified hazards, incidents, and accidents.
6. Develop and maintain a pre-accident guide.
7. Support and promote the University Aviation Safety Program.
8. Maintain, review, and recommend revision of the Aviation Safety Program.
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9. Maintain a risk mitigation process that assigns accountability and tracks the
mitigation efforts to completion.
10. Facilitate confidential communication between flight students, instructor pilots,
and flight administration.
11. Provide reports on aviation safety to University management.
12. Distribute aviation safety information and conduct regular meetings with flight
training personnel and flight students.
13. Provide timely advice and assistance on aviation safety matters to line managers
at all levels.
14. Participate in dialogue between safety professionals, Air Traffic Control, airport
management, the University Aviation Safety Council, and the local community to
discuss safety-related matters.
According to ERAU (2011a) under the Director of Aviation Safety, there are Safety
Leaders who are appointed to represent the aviation safety program at the instructor pilot,
student and maintenance technician levels. Safety Leaders are also tasked with assisting
the Director of Aviation Safety with other duties as assigned. Safety Leaders‟
responsibilities include assisting the Director of Aviation Safety in his or her
responsibilities and duties (ERAU, 2011a).
ERAU safety culture. The ERAU Safety Management System (SMS) is founded
on the belief that a vibrant Safety Culture is the key to accident prevention (ERAU,
2011b). The University President knows that ERAU‟s Safety Culture must be strong to
prevent accidents and protect the men and women who make up the Safety Culture.
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The University President has established a written Safety Culture philosophy
called, Our Commitment to Safety:
The well being [sic] and safety of our students, faculty, and staff are of
paramount importance. Safety is an area that requires deliberate effort and a
conscious commitment on the part of everyone in order to truly make a positive
difference. My commitment is to work alongside each of you in ensuring the
safest environment we can collectively achieve.
I encourage open participation and sharing of information, knowledge,
intelligence, wisdom, and whatever other resources are at our disposal to make
our workplace safer for all.
As the University President, I pledge that no disciplinary action will be taken
against any person reporting a safety hazard or concern. I further pledge that those
of you that make significant contributions in improving workplace safety will be
appropriately acknowledged.
Let's all join in creating an atmosphere where safety permeates every part of
our environment. –John P. Johnson (ERAU, 2011b, p. 6)
This Safety Culture philosophy is communicated to employees and students via
posters and Safety Culture videos containing important safety messages from senior
university leadership (ERAU, 2011b).
The Daytona Beach Flight Training Department also has developed 14 safety
values that describe and communicate elements of the Safety Culture (ERAU, 2011a).
These values were developed by a committee comprised of representation from different
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levels in the organization. They are communicated to instructors and students via posters
and video; they are outlined in the ERAU Flight Operations Manual (FOM). They are:
We value:
A confidential, trustworthy system to promote and develop safety.
The importance that mentorship has on the learning process.
The maintenance of a fault and blame free system to minimize human
error.
The sharing of information, knowledge, intelligence, wisdom and
resources, without reservation, in order to improve safety.
Our employees and peers for reporting safety issues and making
contributions to improve our workplace safety.
Our next day of safe operations ahead of us more than our safety record.
That the foundation of safety lies in the attitudes and beliefs of each
individual.
That the protection from harm is each individual‟s responsibility and
requires deliberate effort on their part.
The continuous analysis and improvement of our safety performance
through feedback and communication.
The efforts to report and address even the smallest hazard or safety event.
The opportunity to learn through human error.
The quality and competence of individuals and their motivation to
continually develop their knowledge, skills, abilities.
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The right of any individual to challenge any safety issue to create a safer
environment.
The role teamwork plays in improving safety. (ERAU, 2011a, p. i)
ERAU’s event reporting system. Any student, employee, or contract personnel
observing a hazardous situation, event or concern that could affect flight safety is
encouraged to report it to the Director of Aviation Safety, Safety Leader, or Duty Flight
Supervisor by any available means (ERAU, 2011a). The Director of Aviation Safety will
provide aviation safety reporting forms (blue forms) in accessible areas for this purpose.
Reports can also be made via ERAU‟s event reporting system at http://smart.erau.edu.
Aviation Safety Reports (AvSRs), submitted to the Aviation Safety Department, will be
kept confidential and be non-punitive. No student or employee will be punished for
submitting an AvSR or performing any action self-disclosed in their report except for
reports that involve:
1. Criminal Activity
2. Substance Abuse
3. Controlled Substances
4. Alcohol
5. Intentional falsification
6. Intentional disregard for safety, or intentional violation of the Code of Federal
Regulations. (ERAU, 2011a, p. 23)
According to D. M. McCune (personal communication, January 15, 2012) the
Director of Aviation Safety reviews all submitted Aviation Safety Reports. The Director
of Aviation Safety determines if any safety issue(s) identified in the report require

21
immediate action. The Director of Aviation also determines if the report is unacceptable
for any of the reasons specified for exclusion from the Aviation Safety Program outlined
in the ERAU Flight Operations Manual (FOM). The report is then either investigated by
the Director of Aviation Safety, or delegated to a Safety Leader for investigation. After
the report has been investigated, the findings and recommendations are reviewed by the
Director of Aviation Safety. The report is then de-identified and retained in the safety
department‟s database. Select de-identified reports are distributed to flight department
staff and management. Findings and recommendations are forwarded to the appropriate
line managers and routinely briefed to flight department leadership. The confidentiality
of reports are ensured by the Director of Aviation Safety and his aviation safety
department staff. Only aviation safety staff knows the identity of submitters of AvSRs.
Nearly all AvSRs are submitted with the submitter‟s name and contact information for
follow-up. The Aviation Safety Department received 336 reports in 2011 at an average
rate of 51 reports per 10,000 flight hours. (D. M. McCune, personal communication,
January 15, 2012)
Summary
An important element of an Aviation Safety Program or an SMS is an internal
safety-reporting program. The success of the program is reliant on a strong safety culture
that supports the reporting of safety-related issues by front line employees. The FAA has
established safety-reporting programs that offer enforcement-related incentives in order
to encourage the submission of safety-related events from pilots.
The NASA ASRS is available for all pilots, while an ASAP is only available to
pilots who work for an FAA certificated operator. NASA ASRS reports do allow pilots
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to help improve the overall safety effort, however, the database doesn‟t particularly help
improve the safety of a specific operator. Operators need an internal reporting system
that is specific to their operation, providing data about safety issues the operator needs to
address. An ASAP is designed for operators to have their own internal reporting system
in partnership with the FAA. Having an ASAP also affords similar, if not arguably more,
protection than the NASA ASRS program.
ERAU currently operates an internal safety reporting system. This program is
administered by their Aviation Safety Department that is led by the Director of Aviation
Safety. The program collects important safety data regarding ERAU‟s flight training
operation. The program is designed for strict confidentiality and a commitment of nonpunitive action from submitting AvSRs.
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Chapter III
Methodology
This study consisted of the development of a survey and an interview instrument
to measure the current safety reporting culture and the possible impact, if the Flight
Training Department at ERAU (Daytona Beach Campus) was to implement a formal
ASAP. A survey was designed to gather the flight instructors‟ perceptions of safety
reporting and the impact on the reporting culture, if an ASAP was implemented. A
structured interview, consisting of a subset of questions contained in the survey, was
administered to Flight Department management and flight instructor leadership to isolate
their perceptions on the current safety reporting culture and the perceived impact an
ASAP would have. The data were collected using a web-based solution, analyzed with
statistical treatments and examined to gain insights into the perceptions of the impact of
formalizing an ASAP.
Research Approach
The study was a descriptive study using a quantitative and qualitative mixedmethods research approach. The goal was to survey and interview participants to gather
their subjective perceptions and experiences on the safety-reporting program and of the
FAA‟s ASAP.
A 28-item survey was designed to gather data that could characterize the safety
reporting culture of the organization within the Flight Department; the knowledge base of
an ASAP; and the desire, concerns and possible consideration of implementing an ASAP.
The researcher, in coordination with Flight Department management, developed the
instrument. Also a collection plan was developed in order to give each flight instructor
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the opportunity and privacy to take the survey. The data were collected directly from the
participants using a computer-based survey tool called SurveyMonkey (SurveyMonkey,
2011) in university computer classrooms.
A 20-item structured interview was also developed that contained a subset of the
questions presented on the 28-item survey. This interview form was used to gather both
quantitative and qualitative data, comparable to the data collected from flight instructors
on the survey, but from key leadership in the Flight Department. All the interviews were
performed one-on-one by the researcher. The data were entered directly into
SurveyMonkey (SurveyMonkey, 2011) during the interview either by the participant or
the researcher.
The data were analyzed using SPSS® (IBM, 2010) to find relevant patterns, to
draw conclusions, and to address the study‟s research questions.
Population/Sample
The population used for the survey instrument was all ERAU Flight Department
instructor pilots. At the time the survey was administered, the total number of instructor
pilots employed by the Flight Department was 137. The number of instructor pilots who
took the survey was 115. Assuming a random sample and a population with a normal
distribution, the results can be used to generalize to the entire population with 95 percent
certainty (Krejcie and Morgan, 1970). The structured interview was administered to all
flight department management personnel to include the Flight Department Chairman, the
Chief Flight Instructors, the Assistant Chief Flight Instructors, Training Managers and a
sample of four Instructor Pilot leadership personnel.
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Data Collection Device
The survey was administered during the Fall term in 2011. All of the participants
in the survey were employed instructors or standards pilots for the Flight Department.
Participation was voluntary, but the study was fully endorsed by Flight Department
Management and Supervisors.
The structured interview was administered to one Flight Department Chairman,
one Chief Flight Instructor, two Assistant Chief Flight Instructors, five Training
Managers, two Instructor Pilot Quality Council members, and two Instructor Pilot Union
leadership representatives. All of the participants in the interviews were employed by the
Flight Department. Participation in the interviews were also voluntary.
The survey instrument was comprised of a total of 28 items; 27 Items collected
information data variables of interest, and one item collected free (qualitative) responses
(see Appendix B).
A five-choice Likert scale was used to collect information on 22 of the 27 data
variables. Of the 22 data variables, 21 of them (Questions 3-11, Questions 14-18 and
Questions 21-27) used a Likert scale anchored by “Strongly Agree” and “Strongly
Disagree”. The other data variable (Question 2) used a Likert scale to measure
knowledge level from “Very Knowledgeable” to “No Knowledge”. The other five data
variables (Question 1, Questions 12-13, and Questions 19-20) were multiple-choice
options with two of them allowing the selection of more than one answer.
The structured interview instrument was comprised of a total of 20 items: 14
items (Questions 2-15) collected information data variables of interest, one item
(Question 1) collected demographic data, and five items (Questions 16-20) collected free
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(qualitative) responses (see Appendix C). A five-choice Likert scale was used to collect
information on 12 of the 14 data variables. Of the 12 data variables, ten (Questions 4-13)
used the Likert scale, anchored by “Strongly Agree” and “Strongly Disagree”. The other
data variable (Question 3) was used to measure knowledge level from “Very
Knowledgeable” to “No Knowledge”. The other two data variables (Questions 14-15)
were multiple-choice options.
Both the survey instrument and structured interview were entered into
SurveyMonkey (SurveyMonkey, 2011), an online data collection web-based service.
Instructor Pilot survey participants were separated into six groups based on what training
manager or “team” they reported to. Each group was scheduled in a university classroom
with a sufficient number of computers available for each participant. Each group was
briefed on the survey by the researcher or one of his designees. Then the participants
were provided a SurveyMonkey (SurveyMonkey, 2011), hyperlink to access the online
survey. This distribution method controlled access to the instrument. Participants were
compensated their normal hourly wage while they took the survey. Completion times
ranged from 15 to 30 minutes and participants were given ample time to complete the
survey. All of the survey participants‟ responses were captured by SurveyMonkey
(SurveyMonkey, 2011), aggregated, downloaded and imported into SPSS® (IBM, 2010)
for analysis.
The structured interview participants were met one-on-one by appointment with
the researcher. The participant and researcher met privately in an available office with a
computer workstation with internet access. The researcher briefed the structured
interview instrument and provided a SurveyMonkey (SurveyMonkey, 2011) hyperlink to
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the participant. The participant was seated at the computer and while the researcher
asked the questions the participant was instructed to enter his responses into
SurveyMonkey (SurveyMonkey, 2011). This distribution method controlled access to the
structured interview data collection instrument. Participants were compensated at their
normal hourly wage, if hourly; or they performed the interview during their normal work
hours, if salaried. Completion times ranged from 15 minutes to one hour. All of the
interview participants‟ responses were captured by SurveyMonkey (SurveyMonkey,
2011), aggregated, downloaded and imported into SPSS® (IBM, 2010) for analysis.
Instrument reliability. For the IP perception survey, reliability was tested with
questions written to elicit the same response: Questions 22 and 23, and Questions 26 and
27. For the structured interview, reliability was tested with questions written to elicit the
same response: Questions 12 and 13.
Instrument validity. The researcher implemented actions and selected
methodologies with the intention of producing results with content validity. The survey
instrument was validated by subject matter experts including: Dr. Guy Smith, Department
Chair – Applied Aviation Sciences; Dr. Tim Brady, Dean of the College of Aviation; Mr.
David Zwegers, ASAP Analyst, JetBlue; and Mr. Ken Byrnes, Department Chair – Flight
Training. Three instructor pilots who work in the Aviation Safety Department also
reviewed the survey instrument for content validity. The input from all subject matter
experts was incorporated into the survey. The same questions from the survey were
incorporated into the structured interview, along with the input received from the subject
matter experts.
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Treatment of the Data
Descriptive statistics. For the IP perception survey, interval data from Questions
3-11, 14-18, and 21-27 were described using tables to include the N, mean, SD, min and
max values. Ordinal data from Questions 1, 2, 12, 13, 19, and 20 were described using
figures. For the structured interview, interval data from Questions 4-13 were described
using tables to include the N, mean, SD, min and max values. Ordinal data from
structured interview Questions 2, 3, 14, and 15 were described using figures.
Reliability testing. For the IP perception survey, Pearson correlations were
calculated to test the reliability of Questions 22 and 23, and Questions 26 and 27. For the
structured interview, Pearson correlations were calculated to test the reliability of
Questions 12 and 13.
Qualitative data. In the IP perceptions survey, respondents were able to provide
qualitative data in the comments section. Selected comments were used in Chapter V to
provide breadth and depth to the quantitative analysis. In the structured interview,
respondents were able to provide qualitative data in four questions (Questions 16-19)
formatted for qualitative data and in the comments section. If possible, comments were
grouped into similar topics and selected comments were used in Chapter V to provide
breadth and depth to the quantitative analysis.
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Chapter IV
Results
Descriptive Statistics
IP perception survey. For the IP survey, 115 valid survey responses were
reviewed. Prior to the survey, the instructor pilots were provided a briefing on the ASAP
by the Director of Aviation Safety during one of their regularly scheduled team meetings.
The briefing consisted of an overview of what the ASAP entails and how it differs from
ERAU‟s current event reporting system and NASA‟s ASRS. Question 1 asked the
participants if they had in fact received this briefing, to which 83% responded yes and
17% responded no. See Figure 3.

Received ASAP Briefing
No
20
17%

Yes
95
83%

Figure 3. Instructor Pilots who received a briefing about ASAP from the Director of
Aviation Safety.
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Question 2 of the IP perception survey asked the participants to rank their
perceived level of knowledge of ASAP. Of the 115 participants who responded, 57.4%
reported they had a basic understanding of ASAP, 17.4% reported they were somewhat
knowledgeable about the ASAP, 14.8% reported they had very little knowledge of
ASAP, 8.7% reported being very knowledgeable about ASAP, and 1.7% reported having
no knowledge of ASAP. See Figure 4.

Knowledge of ASAP
66
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%

20

17

10

2

10%
0%
Very
Knowledgeable

Somewhat
Knowledgable

Basic
Understanding

Very Little
Knowledge

No Knowledge

Figure 4. Level of knowledge of ASAP among Instructor Pilots.

Questions 3-6 asked the participants what factors motivated them to submit
AvSRs. The questions were asked on a Likert scale from strongly agree (5) to strongly
disagree (1) with a neutral option of neither agree nor disagree (3). Questions 3-6 also
provided an option for the participants to indicate that they did not currently submit
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safety reports. Of the 115 participants who responded to Questions 3-6, four indicated on
one or more of the questions that they did not currently submit AvSRs. Since these
respondents indicated they did not submit safety reports their responses were removed
from analysis for Questions 3-6. Table 1 shows Questions 3-6, ranked by the mean from
highest motivator to lowest motivator.

Table 1
Motivators to Submit AvSRs

Q3. Organization and Peers
Q6. Non Punitive
Q5. Confidential
Q4. Feedback

N
111
111
111
111

Mean
4.23
3.87
3.85
3.77

SD
.63
.82
1.07
.91

Min
2
2
1
1

Max
5
5
5
5

Questions 7-11 asked the participants what factors de-motivated them from
submitting AvSRs. The questions asked on a Likert scale from strongly agree (5) to
strongly disagree (1) with a neutral option of neither agree nor disagree (3). Table 2
shows Questions 7-11, ranked by the mean from highest de-motivator to lowest demotivator.
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Table 2
De-motivators to Submit AvSRs

Q11. Certificate Protection
Q8. Non Punitive
Q7. Confidential
Q10. Feedback
Q9. Organization and Peers

N
115
115
115
115
115

Mean
2.69
2.37
2.15
1.88
1.70

SD
1.15
1.04
1.07
.84
.82

Min
1
1
1
1
1

Max
5
5
5
5
5

In Question 12, participants were asked to indicate the methods they used to
report a safety-related event that they were involved in. Question 13 asked what methods
participants used to report safety-related events they witnessed. Both questions provided
the same options: file a NASA ASRS report, file an ERAU AvSR, file an Ops
Discrepancy report, and do nothing. Participants were able to select more than one
option for Questions 12 (involved in a safety-related event) and Question 13 (witnessed a
safety-related event). Figure 5 shows the breakdown for responses for Questions 12 and
13.
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Reporting Methods
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

105
85
52
49 48
8
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26
Q12: Involved
3

14

Q13: Witness

Figure 5. Breakdown of preferred reporting methods for Instructor Pilots.

In Questions 14-18 and 21, participants were asked what concerned them about
the supposed implementation of an ASAP. Questions 14-18 focused on whether the
participants were concerned about different groups‟ involvement in an ASAP, while
Question 21 asked whether the participants were concerned about the loss of the current
reporting system, if an ASAP was implemented. The questions were asked on a Likert
scale from strongly agree (5) to strongly disagree (1) with a neutral option of neither
agree nor disagree (3). Table 3 shows Questions 14-18 and 21, ranked by the mean from
highest concern to lowest concern.
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Table 3
Areas or Groups that Cause Concern with the Implementation of an ERAU ASAP

Q15. FAA

N
115

Mean
3.28

SD
1.14

Min
1

Max
5

Q21. Loss of AvSR‟s

115

3.06

1.03

1

5

Q14. Management

115

2.98

1.00

1

5

Q18. Students

115

2.83

1.06

1

5

Q17. Instructors
Q16. Union

115
115

2.45
2.41

1.05
.92

1
1

5
5

Question 19 provided five options on who participants felt should be the
management representative for an ASAP ERC. The options were: Assistant Chief Flight
Instructor of Operations, Assistant Chief Flight Instructor of Standards, Training
Manager(s), or Director of Aviation Safety. They also had an option to specify another
management position. Participants could only select one option. Of the 115 responses;
47% selected the Director of Aviation Safety, 31.3% selected Training Manager(s), 9.6%
selected the Assistant Chief Flight Instructor of Operations, 7.8% selected the Assistant
Chief Flight Instructor of Standards, and 4.3% selected Other. See Figure 6.
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Management ERC Representative-IP
Selection
50%

54

40%
36

30%
20%
10%
0%

11

9
5

ACFI,
Operations

ACFI,
Standards

Training
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Director,
Aviation Safety

Other

Figure 6. Instructor Pilots‟ preferred management ERC representative.

Question 20 provided six options on who participants felt should be the pilot
representative for an ASAP ERC. The options were: the Instructor Pilot Quality Council
Chairman, an Instructor Pilot Quality Council Representative, the Instructor Pilot Union
President, an Instructor Pilot Executive Board Member, or an Instructor Pilot Union
Steward. They also had an option to specify another pilot representative. Participants
could only select one option. Of the 115 responses; 27.8% selected Instructor Pilot
Union President, 24.3% selected an Instructor Pilot Quality Council Representative, 20%
selected Instructor Pilot Quality Council Chairman, 12.2% selected an Instructor Pilot
Executive Board Member, 7.8% selected a Union Steward, 4.35% selected Other
(specifying an IP independent of the Union or IPQC) and 3.48% selected Other
(unspecified). Figure 7 shows the breakdown of the selection of pilot ERC
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representative, grouping the selections for union and IPQC options together, which shows
47.8% of participants selected a position affiliated with the IP union while 44.3%
selected a position affiliated with the IPQC.

Pilot ERC Representative-IP Selection
50%
45%

9

Other

40%
35%

14

Independent IP

28

30%

IPQC Representative

25%

IPQC Chairman

20%
15%

Union Steward
32

Union Executive

23

10%

4
5

5%

Union President

0%
Union

IPQC

Other

Figure 7. Instructor Pilots‟ preferred pilot ERC representative.

Questions 22 and 23 asked the participants if they would change their reporting
habits if an ASAP was implemented. Question 22 asked if they would be more likely to
submit safety reports, while Question 23 asked if they would be less likely to submit
safety reports. The questions were asked on a Likert scale from strongly agree (5) to
strongly disagree (1) with a neutral option of neither agree nor disagree (3). Table 4
shows Questions 22 and 23.
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Table 4
Change in Reporting Habit if an ASAP was Implemented

Q22. More Likely
to Report
Q23. Less Likely
to Report

N
115

Mean
3.01

SD
.79

Min
1

Max
5

115

2.84

.82

1

5

Questions 24 and 25 asked the participants how an ASAP would improve safety
at ERAU. Question 24 asked if they felt an ASAP would improve safety because more
reports would be submitted. Question 25 asked if they felt an ASAP would improve
safety because an ERC would recommend corrective action. The questions were asked
on a Likert scale from strongly agree (5) to strongly disagree (1) with a neutral option of
neither agree nor disagree (3). Table 5 shows Questions 24 and 25, ranked by the mean
from highest perceived improvement on safety at ERAU to lowest.

Table 5
Factors that Would Improve Safety if an ASAP was Implemented

Q25. ERC Corrective Action

N
115

Mean
3.43

SD
.90

Min
1

Max
5

Q24. More Reports Submitted

115

2.97

.79

1

5

Questions 26 and 27 asked the participants what they felt an ASAP‟s impact on
safety would be. Question 26 asked if they felt an ASAP would have a positive impact
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on safety at ERAU, while Question 27 asked if they felt an ASAP would have a negative
impact on safety at ERAU. The questions were asked on a Likert scale from strongly
agree (5) to strongly disagree (1) with a neutral option of neither agree nor disagree (3).
Table 6 shows Questions 26 and 27.

Table 6
ASAP’s Impact on Safety at ERAU

Q26. Positive

N
115

Mean
3.63

SD
.82

Min
1

Max
5

Q27. Negative

115

2.39

.84

1

5

Leadership structured interview. For the descriptive statistics, four IP
responses were removed to eliminate duplicate data from the IP perceptions survey, since
the IPs interviewed also took the IP perception survey. Nine management personnel were
surveyed and four instructor pilots in leadership positions. Of the nine management
personnel who responded to the structured interview; five identified themselves as middle
management and four identified themselves as upper management.
The management staff was also provided a briefing on the ASAP by the Director
of Aviation Safety during one of their regularly scheduled team meetings. Question 2
asked the participants if they had in fact received this briefing, to which 100% (9
managers) answered yes.
Question 3 of the structured interview asked the participants to rank their
perceived level of knowledge of ASAP. Of the 9 management participants: 55.6%
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reported being somewhat knowledgeable about ASAP, 22.2% felt they had a basic
understanding about ASAP, 11.1% felt they had very little knowledge of ASAP, 11.1%
reported being very knowledgeable about ASAP, and 0% reported having no knowledge
of ASAP. See Figure 8.

Management Knowledge of ASAP
60%
50%
40%
30%

5

20%
10%

2
1

1
0

0%
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Knowledgeable Knowledgeable Understanding

Very Little
Knowledge

No Knowledge

Figure 8. Breakdown of level of knowledge of ASAP among managers surveyed.

In Questions 4-9 of the structured interview, participants were asked what
concerned them about the implementation of an ASAP. Questions 4-8 focused on
whether the participants were concerned about different groups‟ involvement in an
ASAP, while Question 9 asked whether the participants were concerned with the loss of
the current reporting system, if an ASAP was implemented. The questions were asked on
a Likert scale from strongly agree (5) to strongly disagree (1) with a neutral option of
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neither agree nor disagree (3). Table 7 shows Questions 4-9, ranked by the mean from
highest concern to lowest concern.

Table 7
Areas or Groups that Cause Concern with the Implementation of an ERAU ASAP

Q5. FAA

N
9

Mean
2.78

SD
1.30

Min
1

Max
5

Q9. Loss AvSR‟s

9

2.33

1.03

1

5

Q6. Union
Q8. Students

9
9

2.33
2.33

1.12
1.66

1
1

4
5

Q4. Management

9

2.11

1.17

1

4

Q7. Instructors

9

1.67

.71

1

3

Questions 10 and 11 asked the participants how an ASAP would improve safety
at ERAU. Question 10 asked if they felt an ASAP would improve safety because more
reports would be submitted. Question 11 asked if they felt an ASAP would improve
safety because an ERC would recommend corrective action. The questions were asked
on a Likert scale from strongly agree (5) to strongly disagree (1) with a neutral option of
neither agree nor disagree (3). Table 8 shows Questions 10 and 11, ranked by the mean
from highest perceived improvement of safety at ERAU to lowest.
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Table 8
Factors that Would Improve Safety if an ASAP was Implemented

Q11. ERC Corrective Action

N
9

Mean
3.78

SD
1.09

Min
1

Max
5

Q10. More Reports Submitted

9

2.67

1.00

1

5

Questions 12 and 13 asked the participants what they felt would be an ASAP‟s
impact on safety. Question 12 asked if they felt an ASAP would have a positive impact
on safety at ERAU, while Question 13 asked if they felt an ASAP would have a negative
impact on safety at ERAU. The questions were asked on a Likert scale from strongly
agree (5) to strongly disagree (1) with a neutral option of neither agree nor disagree (3).
Table 9 shows Questions 12 and 13.

Table 9
ASAP’s Impact on Safety at ERAU

Q12. Positive

N
9

Mean
3.89

SD
.93

Min
2

Max
5

Q13. Negative

9

2.00

1.00

1

4

Question 14 provided five options on who participants felt should be the
management representative for an ASAP ERC. The options were: Assistant Chief Flight
Instructor of Operations, Assistant Chief Flight Instructor of Standards, Training
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Manager(s), or Director of Aviation Safety. They also had an option to specify another
management position. Participants could only select one option. Of the nine
management personnel responses, 44.4% selected the Director of Aviation Safety, 33.3%
selected Training Manager(s), 11.1% selected the Assistant Chief Flight Instructor of
Operations, 11.1% selected the Assistant Chief Flight Instructor of Standards, and 0%
selected Other. See Figure 9.

Management ERC RepresentativeManagement Selection
60%
40%
1

20%

4

3
1

0%
ACFI, Operations

ACFI, Standards

Training
Manager(s)

Director, Aviation
Safety

Figure 9. Management‟s preferred management ERC representative.

Question 15 provided six options on who participants felt should be the pilot
representative for an ASAP ERC. The options were: the Instructor Pilot Quality Council
Chairman, an Instructor Pilot Quality Council Representative, the Instructor Pilot Union
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President, an Instructor Pilot Executive Board Member, or an Instructor Pilot Union
Steward. They also had an option to specify another pilot representative. Participants
could only select one option. Of the nine management responses, 44% selected Instructor
Pilot Quality Council Chairman, 22% selected an Instructor Pilot Executive Board
Member, 11% selected an Instructor Pilot Quality Council Representative, 11% selected
Other (specifying an IP independent of the Union), and 11% selected Other (specifying a
senior standards IP). Figure 10 shows the breakdown of the selection of pilot ERC
representative, grouping the selections for union and IPQC options together, and shows
22% of participants selected a position affiliated with the IP union, while 55% selected a
position affiliated with the IPQC.

Pilot ERC Representative - Management
Selection
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Other
IPQC Representative
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Figure 10. Management‟s preferred pilot ERC representative.

Union Executive
Union President
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Reliability Testing
For the IP perception survey, Pearson correlations were calculated to test the
reliability of Questions 22 and 23, and Questions 26 and 27. For Questions 22 and 23,
the null hypothesis was: there was no relationship between responses to Question 22 and
23. For Questions 26 and 27, the null hypothesis was: there was no relationship between
responses to Question 26 and 27. Tables 10 and 11 show the results.

Table 10
Pearson Correlation Between Questions 22 and 23 on the IP Perception Survey

More Likely
Less Likely

Pearson Correlation(Sig)
N
Pearson Correlation(Sig)
N

More Likely
1
115
-.565(.000)
115

Less Likely
-.565(.000)
115
1
115

Table 11
Pearson Correlation Between Questions 26 and 27 on the IP Perception Survey

Positive
Negative

Pearson Correlation(Sig)
N
Pearson Correlation(Sig)
N

Positive
1
115
-.764(.000)
115

Negative
-.764(.000)
115
1
115
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For both, reject the null hypotheses. There was a relationship between responses
to Questions 22 and 23, and between responses to Questions 26 and 27.
For the structured interview, Pearson correlations were calculated to test the null
hypothesis: there was no relationship between responses to Questions 12 and 13. Table
12 shows that the Pearson correlation was statistically significant; therefore reject the null
hypothesis. There was a relationship between responses to Questions 12 and 13.

Table 12
Pearson Correlation Between Questions 12 and 13 on the Structured Interview

Positive
Negative

Pearson Correlation(Sig)
N
Pearson Correlation(Sig)
N

Positive
1
9
-.943(.000)
9

Negative
-.943(.000)
9
1
9

Qualitative Data
IP perception survey. For the IP perception survey, 25 of the 117 instructors
who took the survey provided additional comments to support their responses. Of the 25
responses, six were in clear opposition to an ASAP being implemented. Six responses
clearly supported an ASAP and recommended implementation. Five responses
advocated for more education on the ASAP before implementing it. Eight responses
provided concerns or questions and did not clearly advocate for or against an ASAP.
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Leadership structured interview. For the structured interview, nine
management personnel and four instructor pilots in leadership positions were
interviewed. For the interview qualitative data, responses from the four instructor pilots
in leadership roles were considered because there were no equivalent qualitative
questions on the IP perception survey. Of the four instructor pilots in leadership roles,
two were from the instructor pilot union and two were from the Instructor Pilot Quality
Council.
In response to Question 16, “Do you feel ERAU should pursue the formation of a
formal Aviation Safety Action Program?” - Eleven responded yes and two responded no.
All participants responded to Question 17, “What is your biggest concern with
formalizing an Aviation Safety Action Program?” The responses were:
Five responded that their concern would be a decrease in the number of
safety reports.
Three responded that they were concerned with the FAA‟s involvement
with an ASAP.
One responded deciding who would be on the ERC.
One responded involving students in an ASAP.
One responded that an ASAP could slow down the entire safety process.
One responded that the union pilots might get more protection than
managers or non-union pilots.
One responded their concern was everyone not understanding their roles
under an ASAP.
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All participants responded to Question 18, “What do you feel is the biggest
motivator for instructor pilots to report safety events?” Ten responded that the biggest
motivator was either the safety culture or to improve safety for themselves and peers.
Only three responded that the biggest motivator was immunity from punitive action of
some kind.
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Chapter V
Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Discussion
Both the IP perception survey and the leadership structured interview provided
insight into the ERAU Daytona Beach Flight Training Department‟s current perspective
and knowledge of ASAP. The data from both the IP perception survey and the leadership
structured interview can help analyze the impact on the safety culture of the Flight
Training Department from implementing an ASAP. The impact on the safety culture can
then be analyzed to determine whether the effect is desired and, if not desired, whether
the benefits outweigh the negative effect. The data from the two instruments can also
provide guidance for flight department leadership for the implementation of an ASAP, if
leadership should choose to do so.
The IP perception survey data were analyzed to determine perceptions about the
following:
What level of knowledge of ASAP exists among the IPs?
What currently motivates IPs to submit safety reports?
What does not motivate IPs to submit safety reports?
What are the preferred methods for IPs to report safety-related issues?
What would concern the IP population, if ERAU was to implement an ASAP?
Who does the IPs feel should make up the ERC?
How would an ASAP change safety reporting habits among IPs?
Do the IPs feel that an ASAP would improve safety at ERAU and, if so, how?
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Do the IPs feel that an ASAP would have a positive or negative impact on
ERAU‟s overall safety?
The leadership structured interview data were analyzed to determine perceptions
about the following:
What level of knowledge of ASAP exists among management?
What would concern management personnel, if ERAU was to implement an
ASAP?
Does management feel that an ASAP would improve safety at ERAU and, if
so, how?
Does management feel that an ASAP would have a positive or negative
impact on ERAU‟s overall safety?
Who does management feel should make up the ERC?
What is management‟s perception of the motivators for IPs to report safety
issues or events?
A comparison was also done in the following areas between data collected from
IPs and management:
Level of knowledge of ASAP comparison between IPs and management.
Comparison between areas of concern of IPs and management.
Comparison between the perceptions of IPs and management, if an ASAP
would have a positive or negative impact on safety at ERAU.
Comparison between the perceptions of IPs and management, if an ASAP
would improve safety and how it would improve safety.
Comparison between IPs and management on who should be on the ERC.
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Comparison between what reportedly motivates IPs to report safety concerns
and what management believes motivates IPs to report safety concerns.
IP perception survey. It was the goal of the researcher and for flight department
leadership that all IPs should receive a briefing on ASAP from the Director of Aviation
Safety. The purpose of this briefing was to educate the IPs about the ASAP and to
encourage them to study the topic more. However, only 83% of the IPs reported
receiving the briefing. It could be that those who did not receive the briefing were not
working or did not attend the meeting when the briefing on the ASAP was presented to
their team.
The data for the knowledge level of ASAP among IPs appears to be normally
distributed around the mean. The mean level of knowledge about ASAP among IPs was
a basic level of understanding. Though it appears that the IPs knew about the ASAP,
there was not an adequate level of knowledge to prevent misconceptions about the
program and to have an educated stance on the benefits or drawbacks of the program.
Several qualitative statements given by IPs on the IP perception survey support this. For
example, one IP commented, “I currently do not have enough knowledge of the ASAP
system to take a position in regards to pros/cons or versus the ERAU system.” Four
qualitative responses advocated for more education on the ASAP.
The IPs were asked on the IP perception survey what factors motivated them to
submit AvSRs. The highest reported motivator was “the information benefits the
organization and my peers.” The standard deviation was smaller than the responses to
similar questions. Followed by the benefit to the organization and peers, IPs reported
non-punitive protection, followed by confidentiality, and then followed by feedback as
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motivators for submitting safety reports. All these factors had a mean above the neutral
point of the Likert scale, making them important aspects to the IPs.
The IPs were asked on the IP perception survey what factors de-motivated them
from submitting AvSRs. The highest reported de-motivator was “I feel there is no
personal benefit for myself in regards to certificate protection from the FAA from
submitting ERAU Aviation Safety Reports.” Lack of certification protection was
followed by non-punitive protection, followed by confidentiality, followed by feedback,
and then followed by benefit to organization and peers. It is understandable that
certification protection from the FAA would be cited as the highest de-motivator, as the
current ERAU aviation safety reporting program does not offer such protection; it would
only be available through an ASAP. However, it is interesting to note that the mean
response to the question regarding certificate protection as a de-motivator was slightly
below the Likert scale neutral point. In other words, the mean response was between the
neither agree nor disagree and the disagree responses. In fact, for all questions asking
about what may de-motivate IPs from submitting AvSRs, the mean was skewed towards
the disagree end of the Likert scale.
In Questions 12 and 13 of the IP perception survey, IPs were asked which
methods they used to report safety-related events, whether they were involved in them or
witnessed them. Of the IPs surveyed, 89.7% reported that they submitted an ERAU
AvSR when involved in a safety-related event. The next highest method used by IPs
involved in a safety-related event was submitting an ASRS report (44.4%). The highest
reported method for reporting a witnessed safety-related event was also submitting an
ERAU AvSR (72.6%) followed by informing management. About 41% of IPs would
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inform management whether they were involved in a safety-related event or witnessed
one. The data show how important the current ERAU AvSR program is, as a vast
majority of IPs used it to report safety-related events. It is also interesting to note that
only 2.6% of IPs reported doing nothing when involved in a safety-related event;
however, 12% reported doing nothing if they witnessed a safety-related event. Only
6.8% of IPs used the NASA ASRS program when they witnessed a safety-related event.
A possible reason for this is that IPs did not use the ASRS program when it would not
protect them from certificate action.
When IPs were asked about areas of concern with implementing an ASAP
program, the highest reported concern was the involvement of the FAA. The second
highest concern was the loss of the current ERAU AvSR program. The statistical means
for both responses about the FAA and the loss of the current reporting system were
slightly skewed to the Agree side of the Likert scale. The third highest concern was the
involvement of management in an ASAP, with a mean centered at the neutral point in the
Likert scale. The fourth, fifth and sixth concerns were the involvement of students,
instructors, and the union, respectively, in an ASAP; with statistical means slightly
skewed towards the Disagree side of the scale. The concern about the involvement of the
FAA in implementing an ASAP was supported by nine qualitative comments submitted
by IPs in the IP perception survey, which intensified the concern about the FAA being
involved in ERAU‟s safety reporting program.
When IPs were asked who should serve as the management representative to the
ERC, the most selected person was the Director of Aviation Safety, followed by Training
Manager(s). The Assistant Chief Flight Instructors only received 20% of the selections
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from IPs. It seems that more IPs were comfortable having the Director of Aviation
Safety serve as the management representative to the ERC because the Director of
Aviation Safety is currently the only management person directly involved in the safety
reporting program. This would mean little change in management involvement from
what is currently in place.
In regard to IPs selection of a pilot representative to the ERC, the selections were
split among the provided options. No single option got above 30%; the highest selected
was the IP union president. There seemed to be an even split between selection of a
union-affiliated person and an IPQC-affiliated person wherein 47.8% of IPs selected a
union-affiliated person, while 44.3% of IPs selected an IPQC-affiliated person. The
responses provided by IPs did not provide a clear group that the IPs wanted to represent
them on an ERC, if an ASAP was to be developed.
IPs were asked if they would be more likely to submit safety reports if an ASAP
was implemented at ERAU. The mean was centered on the neutral point of the Likert
scale. The reliability of this question was tested by asking the opposite question and
testing for a relationship; the Pearson correlation was statistically significant. There
wasn‟t evidence that IPs would be more or less inclined to submit safety reports under an
ASAP.
IPs were asked if they felt an ASAP would improve overall safety at ERAU. In
one question, they were asked if it would improve safety because IPs would submit more
reports. The mean of the responses was centered at the neutral point of the Likert scale.
In another question, IPs were asked if an ASAP would improve safety because an ERC
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would recommend corrective action. The mean was skewed to the Agree side of the
Likert scale.
The IPs were asked in the survey if they felt an ASAP would have a positive or
negative impact on safety at ERAU. The reliability of these questions was tested for a
relationship. The Pearson correlation was statistically significant. The mean of
responses for IPs feeling that an ASAP would have a positive impact on safety at ERAU
was skewed slightly to the Agree side of the Likert scale.
Leadership structured interview. Management staff were also included in the
briefings regarding the ASAP, along with the instructors they managed. The interviewed
management staff all received the briefing on the ASAP from the Director of Aviation
Safety. Most managers reported being somewhat knowledgeable about the ASAP and
all but one reported at least a basic understanding of the ASAP.
The management staff answered questions identical to questions in the IP
perception survey regarding areas of the ASAP that may cause concern. The concern
with the highest mean was the involvement of the FAA. The loss of the current safety
reporting system, involvement of the union and students followed; they had the same
mean among responses. The next areas of concern were the involvement of management
and the involvement of instructors. All areas of concern had means below the neutral
point in the Likert scale and skewed towards the Disagree side of the scale. This means
that participants tended to disagree that these were strong concerns. Several managers
supported their concerns about FAA involvement in their qualitative responses. One
said, “The FAA is a political entity. A change in administration or perhaps a catastrophic
current event could introduce negatives that are unforeseen at this point.”
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Management were also asked if they felt an ASAP would improve overall safety
at ERAU. In one question, they were asked if it would improve safety because more
reports would be submitted by IPs. The mean of the responses were skewed to the
Disagree side of the Likert scale, tending to disagree that more reports would be
submitted. In another question, management was asked if an ASAP would improve
safety because an ERC would recommend corrective action. The mean was skewed to
the Agree side of the Likert scale.
Management personnel were asked if they felt an ASAP would have a positive or
negative impact on safety at ERAU. The reliability of these questions was tested for a
relationship. The Pearson correlation was statistically significant. The mean of
responses for management feeling that an ASAP would have a positive impact on safety
at ERAU was skewed to the Agree side of the Likert scale, indicating that management
felt an ASAP would have a positive impact on safety at ERAU.
Management participants were asked who should serve as the management
representative on the ERC, if an ASAP was implemented. The most selected person was
the Director of Aviation Safety followed by Training Manager(s). The Assistant Chief
Flight Instructors only received 20% of the selections from managers. Managers were
sensitive about who should represent them on the ERC and the impact on perceptions of
IPs. Most managers supported having the Director of Aviation Safety continue to
represent management or having a manager representative in the lower echelon of the
organization, like a Training Manager.
Management also selected who they felt should be the pilot representative on an
ERC. The most selected position was the IPQC Chairman with 44%. The second was an
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IP union executive with 22%. The third, fourth and fifth were a IPQC representative,
senior standards IP, and an IP independent of the union, respectively, each with 11%.
Management overall favored a person affiliated with the IPQC with 55% of the
selections.
When managers were asked what they felt motivated IPs to report safety
concerns, seven of the nine managers responses indicated something similar to the overall
culture, improving the organization, or helping their peers. An example from one
manager was “Desire to improve their environment/system. Help their peers avoid a
similar situation.” Two cited protection from punitive action only.
IP perception survey and leadership structured interview comparison.
Several similarities and differences were identified between the data from the IP
perception survey and the leadership-structured interview. The similarities could
strengthen assumptions found in either data set, while differences could identify a
difference in perceptions between the two levels of the organization.
One difference is that most managers were somewhat knowledgeable about the
ASAP, while the majority of IPs had only a basic understanding. Both IPs and managers
rated the concern of FAA involvement in an ASAP as the highest concern; based on the
mean, managers appeared to be slightly less concerned. Both IPs and managers tended to
agree an ASAP would have a positive impact on safety. Both IPs and managers felt that
safety reporting wouldn‟t necessarily increase or decrease, but that an ERC
recommending action would improve safety. Management and IPs had similar opinions
about who should be the management representative to an ERC, favoring the Director of
Aviation Safety or a Training Manager. Managers seemed to favor a nonunion pilot to
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represent pilots on the ERC, compared to IPs who were split nearly 50/50 between a
union or IPQC representative. In addition, managers and IPs agreed about what
motivated IPs to report safety concerns; both identified “the information benefits the
organization and peers” as the biggest motivator for submitting safety reports.
Conclusions
Several conclusions can be drawn from the data collected from both the IP
perception survey and the leadership structured interview. These conclusions can help
the Flight Training Department make informed decisions about how to proceed with an
ASAP, if they decide to implement an ASAP. This study has identified areas of concern
that should be addressed and how the Flight Training Department could implement an
ASAP and not negatively impact its current outstanding safety culture.
Research Questions.
What currently motivates ERAU instructor pilots to report safety events? In the
responses to the IP perception survey, IPs reported that the benefit to the organization and
peers was what motivated them to submit safety reports. This was supported by
interview responses from managers who also felt the biggest motivator for ERAU
instructor pilots to report safety concerns was the benefit to their organization and their
peers. Non-punitive action was identified as the second motivator for IPs to submit
safety reports. Lack of certificate protection and not trusting the non-punitive nature of
the program were the top two factors reported as de-motivators by IPs. However, IPs‟
mean responses showed all de-motivators skewed to the Disagree side of the Likert scale;
thus de-motivators were not a major issue. The incentive for reporting under an ASAP is
that the submitter is offered certain certificate enforcement protection. Though the FAA
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feels that certificate enforcement protection strongly motivates pilots to submit safetyrelated concerns, it does not seem to be a strong motivator at ERAU. Though an ASAP
might motivate IPs to report more, there was no significant evidence supporting this
premise in either the IP perception survey or the leadership structured interview.
Would ERAU’s implementation of an ASAP increase safety reporting among
instructor pilots? In the IP perception survey, when asked if an ASAP would change
their reporting habits, IPs indicated they would not submit reports more or less. As
identified in the previous research question, though enforcement-related incentives of an
ASAP may motivate IPs to report safety issues; it was not identified as the biggest
motivator, nor was it a significant de-motivator for IPs. In fact, in management
interviews, several managers expressed their concern about a decrease in reporting
among IPs because of FAA involvement. Due to the low level of understanding of the
ASAP among IPs, more education would be necessary for them to be comfortable. Also
they would need to build trust in the ASAP to see its benefits and to stem any decrease in
reporting. Hopefully safety reporting would increase over time.
What concerns exist among instructor pilots and flight department management
in implementing an ASAP program? The most notable concern about an ASAP
presented by both instructor pilots and management was the involvement of the FAA. In
light of survey and interview results, both instructor pilots and management identified it
as the number one concern. Changing from the current ERAU safety reporting system
was cited as the second highest concern by both groups. This was supported by both IPs
and managers who preferred the Director of Aviation Safety to be involved in safety
reports on behalf of management; they did not strongly support involving other
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management. Another concern was a decrease in reporting because of FAA involvement.
The last concern was a lack of understanding of the program among all involved parties,
which could cause issues including decreased reporting and reduced program
effectiveness.
Recommendations
Further education of flight department staff, specifically instructor pilots, is
needed in order for all persons to fully understand the ASAP. Only then can a betterinformed decision be made by instructor pilots and managers to adopt an ASAP. A
recommendation for further study is to provide a better education package on the ASAP
and provide it to all applicable flight department staff and management. Then the data
collection devices used in this study could be repeated to see if education changes the
results in any way.
Though this study evaluated the possible effect of an ASAP on the ERAU Flight
Training Department‟s reporting culture, it did not clearly indicate whether the IPs
wanted to implement an ASAP. No questions on the IP perception survey pointedly
asked if the IP wanted ERAU to pursue an ASAP. Only in the leadership structured
interview did the researcher ask if ERAU should implement an ASAP, to which ten said
yes, two said no and one said maybe. This data from the IPs would be valuable to make
the decision whether to pursue an ASAP.
One participant of the leadership structured interview said, “My concern is why
do the rest of the approximately 40 universities that offer four year college degree [sic]
with concentration in aviation and the other few thousands [sic] of 141 flight schools in
the country don‟t have an ASAP program. Maybe we need to research why.” This is an

60
intriguing point; of the 61 certificate holders who hold at least one ASAP MOU, only one
of them is a flight school (FAA, 2011d). If ERAU was to implement an ASAP today, it
would be the first aviation college or university to do so and only the second flight
school. A recommendation for further study is to survey all FAA part141 flight schools
and aviation colleges and universities to find out why they do not have an ASAP set up, if
they plan to set up an ASAP, and what are the reasons for adopting an ASAP or not
adopting an ASAP.
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